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I. ORGANIZATION
This may be the greatest practical coatributiam of European Marxism.
I am aot thiakiag ©f the siagle party state as such-that does aot 
aecedsarily have aaythiag much to da with Marxism (e.g. Taaz&aia) 
aad ualess ©ae wishes ta say the c©astitutiaa af the Fifth Republic 
is (was?) Marxist ia mature it is quite as easy ta argue that Franco- 
phonic Africa's model has been Gaullist ia its neve t© aae partyism 
and its maaagemeat ©f the process. (I argued this ia print ©ace ia re 
the Canerooa-evideiitly the Francophoaic African states can ga further 
and be mare ruthless than their meater.)
The clearest case is Fraacophcaic West Africa. The old RBA was nurt­
ured, pratected (when PCF was ia government), advised, indoctrinated 
by PCF. It was organized as a separate affiliated party for a number 
af reasons. (The French Communists in West Africa organized eercles 
to study Marxism fend included selected Africans as students in them 
but never-except perhaps transitorily in Senegal at an earlier stage 
tried t© get PCF cells including Africans). First, the Africans both 
emotionally and tactically wanted a separate party. Second, the danger 
af repressian was less. Third, the PCF was very French and very Paris 
centred and did nat really feel African cells weuld beMproper".
The EDA up t© 1950 was a very close ally of PCF indeed. This included 
the men who presently emerged as evident conservatives e.g. H-J. The 
Secretary General was then Ga/briel d'Arb. At the 1950(1 think) Conf­
erence the EDA broke with the PCF,junked G d ’A, and installed a H-J 
candidate (I think Ouezzin Coulibally -Upper Voltan but of Parti Ben- 
ocratique de la Cote d'lveire by residence and membership.) over the 
opposition ©f PDG (not then at all well organized-the Fulani chiefs 
and coastal old telite-a la Wallerstein's terminology- then had a 
very workable ’'parti d'administration” geing) and the ¥ni©n Soudanais 
(somewhat similar case- Fili Dab© Sissoko was still riding high) . The 
reasons for the break were brutally pragmatic. PCF affiliation left 
the Rll permanently in opposition in France ana permanently subject 
to repression at home. T© switch to a policy ©f always or almost 
always supporting the man who was to make a government in return for 
being given a moderately free handtt© organize and some reforms looked 
likely to pay better. S© did stopping mass demonstrations and strikes 
and eall3 for immediate independence in return for being allowed t© 
win territorial and Grand Conseil (the AEF assembly at L>afcar) as well 
as French parliamentary seats. The thinking was most subtle in the 
PDCI. H-J (and I thinic by then already perhaps Rafael Sailer) had 
decided that the way to prosper was to argue in France that the 
Ivory Coast was really a backward French province and must be helped
t© come up to standard a la Corsica.
The decay of the mass organization of the RBA probably can be dated 
to the bre^k with the PCF and the end ©f repression which had acted 
as a stimulus in some respects. (Guinea and Mali are exceptions to 
this rule.)
Senegal doesn't fit this pattern very well. Jecause ©f the old 
cities (from Louis Philippe? or Napoleon III?) there had been French
politics in Dakar-Rufisque-Goree-St. Louis for a very long time. The
old dominant party was French Socialist which had branches. Its leader 
was Lamine Gueye. (En passant I suppose ibhat his presence in govt, and 
his securing the electoral and status reforms of L©i Lamine Gueye 
influenced the EDA decision to break with PCF and join the cabinet- 
government forming game.) Senghor was certainly influenced intellec- 
ually by French Marxism but he was always a Marxiste,mais. In Senegal 
he ousted L.G. by use of mass organizational tactics on the secalled 
citizens (old communes)-subjeets (newly enfranchised) issue with the 
backing of the great Marabout leaders. Possibly Mamadou Dia is the 
most promising Marxist leader in Senegal spectrum but I think his 
influences are also heavily French gauche Catholic. The totally Marx­
ist parties have been either regional splinfeOr groups (Casaaance) or 
university centred intellectual cliques. The former had a nasq but ©me unrelated to Marxism and the latter did not want to have 
dirty hands and thus had little real trade union success. (1GTAN was never dominant m  Senegal.)
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Guinea and Mali da fairly consistently fit in with Marxist organiz­
ation. It is perhaps not irrelevant that the party bases and inter- 
territorial positions were more coasistent with being Marxist.' Mali 
was desparately poor,needed federation, felt oppressed by the Metropot 
at Dakar, had no real old elite (of a modern kind at any rate) and 
only a very petty new elite. The PDG was trade union based. The PBCI 
per contra grew ©ut of a much older Jaule regional group of large Africa] 
Planters originally farmed t© protest that during the depression French 
planters received corvee and prison labour free and African planters 
did not. (Pdrhaps not a raison d ’etre Marx would have found any to# 
promising as the mortar for the foundation of a Communist party.')
In the Cameroon ©me again has a Marxist organized and indeed Marxist 
party-the UPC. However, it was successfully repressed and never either 
broke with PC? nor came to power. The ADA was very weak in ABP partly 
because it was less educated (relative term) and partly because De Gaullt 
had an appeal there stemming from fact that his first armed forces to 
move into successful battle were those of LeClere from the Cameroon 
(a fact the names and statues in Yaounde and Doufcai, constantly remind 
everyone)and as a result the Jt»zzaville Conference marked a promise 
by De Gaulle to reward Praacophonic Africa which was more immediate 
and believed in AEP. Also Felix Eboue (sp) had been Governor General 
there during the war and he was b&aek giving greater assurance that 
an African could be Governor General of A®F. In Cameroon^ Louis Aujolat 
( a creole I believe) came to power with H o c  Camerounaise(perhaps not 
exact name) representing French andold elite votes with Ahidje repress 
enting new elite and Northern chiefs (more the former) as junior part­
ner. Ahidjo used popular reaction against war on UPC t© take over. He 
then split WPC by offering amnesty and legal status if they would come 
out of the woods. Half did. Ruben Dm Nyobe was by then dead and Moumie 
Xexpelled from 1PC by Ryobe for choosing to fight war from Zurich) in 
xile. UPC (legal) ended in a sad alliance with remnants of Aujolat 
roup parties and shared final banning with them. Ahidj® has never 
been even verbally very Marxist. He is left Catholic influenced in 
some respects (no-he is a Moslem) but hardly PCF.
In Niger (like Senegal a non-RDA state) Djibo Dakary was probably 
PCF.influenced. Once RDA was anti-communist FRA tended t© sound more 
radical because it was the minority party except in Niger and Senegal 
(Senegal special case-aot always PRA anyhow) and needed a radical ap­
peal. PRA (lakary led Niger PRA ie Sawaba) tried for a non vote and 
was broken and pushed out by French-Hausa chief3-Di®ry(RDA). In oppos­
ition lakary certainly became Marxist influenced but not very effect­
ively on guerilla tactics it would seea . (This may be unfair-Niamey has 
had to call in French troops several times.)
In Chad ©ne might argue that David Dacico was moving to a communist 
type party structure before Colonel Jokassa ousted him with the cry 
"Vive de Gaulle.' Vive la France libre.'" on his lips (literally). He 
had moved up Marxist (at least verbally) intellectuals and tried to 
create a strong youth wing and a party education unit. In part this 
was probably Maoist influence.
In Congo (1) Pascal Lissouba and his bit of the trade unions did use 
Marxist tactics and organization. The backbone of the coup against 
Abbe Youlou was Army-Hatholic Trade Union. The army was -at that 
point-eased out and so were the Christian trade unionists. The youth 
wing was built up as a radical power center. Mamsmaba-Deba.t 3eems to 
have been much less Marxist in power building until after the army 
coup beaten off by his Cuban guard when he turned t© youth wing militia as weli-in the end unsucessfully.
If Patrice Lumumba was wording ©n a Marxist organizational model (or a 
tactical one) it must have been by pretty remote thought transferance. 
Anicet Kashimura perhaps. In his later stages perhaps Thomas Kanza but 
tie never aid create a base. Soumiiailat and Mulele are more surface 
Maoist-Gueveraist based on tribal loyalties but there certainly was
a clear class struggle line to the organization and a probably directly 
i?flue®ce(? use of Marxist guerrilla tactics. (Not that Marx was a theoretician of guerriall warfare to the best of ay knowledge^)
Anglophonic Africa seems rather dud. Nkrumah's ”Cicilert does suggest 
on BCP. "Towards Colonial Freedom" ditto. (And Padmcre was 
a Marxist even if he had broken with CP.) The trouble here is that the 
organising genius of the CPP was not Nkrumah but Komia Gbedemah and 
it is a trifle difficult to think of X.A. as following Marxist principle 
even in party organizing, By the tine Marxists were running the CPP 
it was no longer a nass party and was deliberately being kept from 
any real hold on power levers. ( I an assuning that one accepts that 
Tawai Adanafi© and J. K. Tettegah were never Marxists.)
Siaka Stevens in S. Leone nay be a better exanple of a Marxist infl­
uenced organizational pattern. (This is to a large extent another 
trade union based party a la the PDG.) I aua not very well acquainted 
with S.L. politics ©n the organizational detail level.
In the Mahgreb Majoub ben Seddek (sp.) and tie Trade Union Movement 
in Morocco have been Marxist in organization (though with some of 
¥GT weaknesses) and have tried t® graft ®n peasant and unorganized 
labour affiliates. I ’d think they were well ahead of more verbally 
orthodox Marxists like the late Mehdi Ben larka in that respect.
In Algeria and Tunisia the PC? was badly hampered by its very late 
arrival at supporting independence. There were CP’s in each country quite separate from and more pro administration than the ultimate 
nationalist parties. Thus the direct organizational impact was rather 
low.
II.RHETORIC
Here one has a field day. Rather simplified Marxist terminology is 
common coinage. Liberia and the Ivory Coast are about the only con­
sistent exceptions (IC since 1950)* Xven Kenya and at one stage 
Malawi use the phrases.
This has a rather curious result-Marx often ends as the objective 
bondservant of neo-colonialism with the use ©f his words t© hide 
reality and-more than incidentally-s©metimes to delude those who 
use them. In Congo (B) when Lisseuba was still PM the Finance Min­
ister could say perfectly seriously in answer to a question on 
the effects ©f French policy on Congo(B) "But if it were not in our 
interests they would never a® it.”
It isn't clear that the false use is deliberate. The phrases came into 
general circulation in the context of anti-colonial, anti-imperial 
struggle and thus entered the vocabulary. Further they are a good deal 
cAtchier than Plato and J.S. Mill (or Talleyrand and General MacMahon 
f©r that natter though Jules Ferry was phrasemonger enough...but with 
an offputting content for Africans.') .
The phrases are dangerous to the user. They have a good chance ©f del£ 
uding the external auditor. (Part of Ghana's incredibly bad external 
PR related to rhhtoric. West African rhetoric in general is of course 
extreme by any standards which again predisposes to Marxist rbfetoric.) 
lut it can also lead to the speaker mistaking the substance for the 
reality. (Again Ghana...there is some reason to think that Nkrumah 
mistook a speech ©r a book for an implemented programme of action 
ts carry out ideas of same...)
III.OBSTACLES
Marx has sufferred very much bec-use hi3 early disciples in/to Africa 
were Europeans who were not much lees Eurocentric and superior than 
the typical Europeans concerned with Africa. I have already mentioned 
the case of the Cercles.
The BCP advisers in Ghana were incredible. Their ideas of organization 
and policy did not bear examination for one minute but by usinf rhet­
oric they got a number of them accepted. (I used to argue with Ion 
Bellamy that if he believed the laudatory articles he wrote and got 
people to believe and act on it he was both violating the Marxist
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primcipie of looking at objective reality and diing a tremendous 
disservice to both Ghana and Socialise,) Granted the 1CP has the 
special problem af never having been a mass party nor near power 
so it has little idea of how to organize t© win, hold, or use power 
but its people did strike me as feeling "anything is good enough for 
Africans1 and seeing Parliament House in Accra as a subway stop to 
Whitehall.
In South Africa the same problem has repeatedly arisen cf Time Longer 
Tftan Hope re the ICV, the gingerly relations of AHC with Congress of
Democrats, the PAC denunciation of CPSA. ANC may now be Marxist (albeit 
both the ANC and PAC people I know strike me as very bourgois indeed) 
but its organization ©wed little t© CP.
The Algeria-Tunisia problem over independence was mentioned earlier. 
PC? was very French indeed on that issue until quite late in the day. 
(I’m not sure they changed before Mendes-Franee ©n Tunisia.)
Aime Cesaire’s “Open Letter to Maurice Thorez” resigning from the 
PCF is fairly typical of the reaction (Padmore’s break with Comint­
ern is Anglophonic parallel). It denounces the PCF i» no uncertain 
(and very Marxist) terms as the new imperialism, as culturally and 
morally and intellectually Eurocentric as the ©id, trying to force 
Africans ( including Martiniqueans in this case) into France-Colony 
straightjacket, denying opportunity of unity of all Tiers Monde and 
all progressive forces.
IV. THE PR01LEM OF MARX OH COLONIES
Marx himself is a basic problem re the above. He most certainly was 
Eurocentric and didn’t believe i* independent colonial revolts against 
the center ushering in socialism.
More serious-Marx believed in trade and colonialism as engines of 
growth. He did met,@f course, believe they would lead to a satisfactory 
capitalism but he most certainly did believe the broke the traditional 
culture and society (which he saw as ga<fcAlt© break)and would by say 
i960 bring India et alia to the state of the UK in I860 when one could 
get d©wn to serious business.
I suspect this lack of any relevant biblical passages when coupled with 
L'he stage approach leads to the rather dithery European Socialist 
prescriptions on and views about Africa. They can turn out to be quite 
pro some, controlled foreign capital t© create a controlled capitalist 
stage under a national unity front including the elite/On the other 
hand they can als@ be quite pro a state rather than a private capit­
alist phase. (In Ghana they argued a mixed line.)
Presumably also this lack ©f guidance leads to the recurrent fears 
that African would be socialist states are trying to go to© fast. 
This was true in re Ghana and seems t© be here.
An even nastier problem arises from Marx on surplus value, ly any 
literal reading (even of Vol. Ill albeit ©n£ can get almost anything 
•ut @f tnat-I once had a Marxist colleague who got an early and 
inferior version of Hayek ©» business cycles out of it. I fancied 
that a rather poor cempliaent to Marx.*) of surplus value-labour 
the©ry any exchange of industrial products for primary products 
necessarily results in expm*pmiati©n of what is rightfully the 
primary producer’s. SUT in trade with primary producers USSR sells 
industrial goods. Worse,it sells them at world prices and buys pri­
mary products at world price (and charges interest on loans if we 
want to catalogue more blasphemies). Poor Professor Potehkin was
always rather frightened when asked that one Per the next
section Lenin Qn Imperialism much less R©sa(on the same)is also 
booby trapped.(Professor Szentes also dodges on this type of question 
by the by. I think he could be pinned down to admitting that in a per­
ipheral sense in terms ©f Socialist Europe-Tiers Monde trade relations 
Socialist Europe was ©n the exploiter aide of an industrial world- 
underdeveloped world contradiction. The whole logic ©f his analysis 
•f underdevelopment says this )
OH IM PER IA LISM
Marx had little to say and re the economic development effects,as 
noted, it was wrong. The weltansehaung of class struggle is OK if 
applied to world scene with whole countries in proletariat class 
but Marx did not so apply.
Lenin is rather near straight Hobsen. Apart from a problem of fact 
in getting the empljasis ©n eapital export and in seeing the colonial 
system as critical t© whole national bourgois the book is still very 
Eurocentric.
Rosa Luxembourg is a goed deal more to the point. (How many Africans 
have read her is quite another matter. Rone at CP urging one would 
suppose. A few Fraacophonic ones have done s© e.g. Senegalese.) She 
has proletarian and bourgois nations. (How she would have seen 
a Germany caputred by CP avoiding being a bourgois nation in this 
context had the Spartakists succeeded I don't quite see.) Further 
she has the core of the process dependent on trade not ©n invest­
ment. (The one case that would seem t© hold well for investment 
is Malaysia and that won't do as what ©ne needs is a mass of out­
lets enough to 3tave off final crisis.) This has the advantage of 
making the bourgois nations a little less integrally dependent 
on the continued existence of the proletarian I good at ieast from 
a self reliant point of view as if centre really depends on inter­
national proletariat then nothing much can be changed until the 
center's araageddon and per contra the best way t© work at the 
center is to go ©ut and manipulate the periphery te increase netrepo 
tensions. Neither ©f those is anything but Eurocentrio.) and of 
showing that the economic self interest of the proletariat in the 
bourgois economies can be the same as that of the bourgeis so far 
as relations with the proletarian nations go. (Not a useful paint 
for CP however as by extension the interests of socialist industrial 
countries are bourgois re tiers monde....)
The ne©-imperialist analysis of international economic relations 
does n©t-it seems to me-owe terribly much t© Marx. (I am thinking 
of Part II of Nnit.v or Poverty as a sample of the analysis on 
academic level and Jamal's speeches at last te® IMF ' 3 and at laet 
week's Congress i® Italy and before Pearson Commission in Kampala 
as political spokesman examples.) The relevant economic school of 
thought includes rather diverse figures from Furaiv&ll and Myint 
to Prebisch and Furtade to Seers and Streeten. Of these only 
Furtad© is a Marxist. Seers and Streeten are Marx influenced but 
in terms of Weitanschaung not economic analysis where they view 
both Marx and debates on Marx vb Keyyes (or Ricard©) as mother ir­
relevant bores.(By the by, ny co-author would have a fit ©ver the 
forgoing. Granted she wrote most ©f that section but the theoretical 
frame dropped around it is mine and while it is influenced by Lenin 
and Luxembourg and a Malayan Marxist-James Puthucheary- the dem 
im&nt influences are Furnviall, Seers and five years in Africa and SE Asia.)
President Nyerere's M&eLeugall lecture is a case study. This is 
ns early and brillaint statement of the international" class sytem 
in the international economic system interpreted and presented i* 
coherent economic terms. I assume the technical assistance and
drafting there was by John Sc0tt and Joan Wicken....... The result
could be viewed in the abstract as being from Lenin and Luxembourg
but I doubt it (Equally Amir's presentations are largely his own
reflections plus reading the President plus some technical assist­
ance and ideas ®f mine $## he has acoepted. Gtanted that a number 
©f normally sensible economists e.g. Dharam Ghai,Phil Ndegwa think 
me a left Marxist economist )
VI. POLITICAL THEORY/POLITICAL ECONOMIC THEORY
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This falls into a number of not always easily separable classes.
A.) Clearly Marxist/Marxian influenced but Marxiste mais 
Senghor, Eourguiba
(Bourguiba is rather an oddity because he uses a@re of the 
substance than most but far less of the rhetoric.... This 
is misleading. Par left individuals with open eyes are usually 
exceedingly pleasantly surprised by visiting and studying 
Tu nisa®.. )
31.) Orthodox Marxist written with careful rate application and forcing of facts into frames
Any amount ©f stuffj Presence Africain has printed quite © 
lot as articles and volume's.- Seaegales left is "good" at this
0.) Resaonably creative Marxian writing which is either not her­
etical or only heretical eh secondary issues
Toure, 3ydou Badiari K&uyote, perhaps S a d r  Amin,Keita (if his
speeches are published in collected form;
D.) "0” attempts vhich really d© not c©me off
Nkrunah of Consciencism (though it isn’t really as bad a book
as it is usually rated as being-this 
was an attempt at being an African 
Lenin)
E.) "Faux Amies" which appear to be heavily Marxist influenced but
are not-
Mwali*nu-"MaeDougall Lecture", Arusha Declaration,etc. 
probably Kkruaah Africa Must Unite
J.H. Men sail Ghana 7 Year Flan (this might be in ciassA)
There is s. special problem here in that m©3t political figures wh© 
write books and speeches do use either ghost writers or drafters.
If redrafting is net carefully done by the author one can get very 
odd results e.g. Paul Jomani discoursing on "the inherent contrad­
iction..." .
The case to end all cases (not that the author would necessarily 
have disagreed violently but would have reworded and coherentized 
had he reworked it) is Nkrumah’s Kep-Colonialism. (Consciencisn 
is net... .Professor Abraham certainly did write a draft 'butf he made 
the mistake ®f thinking that was final text when preparing remarks 
for "Grand Launching" and had t© drop his text remarks and end very 
nearly summarizing by reading a line from each page.) That book 
began life a& a set ©f somewaat rand®m nates prepared as background 
material f®r a draft book t© be worked ©ut by Michael Dei Anarg 
and H.M. lasner. Sy some transmuiation it appeared with a bit at 
the beginning and a bit at the end but still very largely undigested 
and unamalgamated notes (e.g. the l©ng, not directly relevant ©r 
at least not made so, and factually not very accurate bit on the 
Patinos and Bolivian tin). Yes, I have indicated who wrote the 
notes but also that they weren’t written t® publish as such. (I 
think the attempt t® get Unity and Poverty -earlier draft- turned 
over t© appear under K.N.’3 name may have fouled up the timing on 
revision and reworking ©f Nee-Colonialism albeit my refusal t©
Play on that didn’t seem t& "lead t© much ill-will,at one point it 
had an introduction by K.N. and was to come out from Heineman. 
Introduction dropped on quite pragamatic grounds that it would have 
limited influence ©f book-it was n©t particularly good as it was 
a collation of snippets from other K.N. books and speeches.)
Who collaborated ©n the earlier-and much better-Africa Must Unite 
I ’m less sure. Possibly parts are Padaore drafted and parts J.H. 
Mensah but I think there is a good deal of Nkrumah ija it. I have 
introduced this discursion because I do see problems in dealing 
with political leaders’ writings when none too sure how much ®? 
it they internalized as well as cleared. E.G. Sessional Paper
7and both political leader statements!© Kenya Plan are very close in 
basic substance t@ Ed Edwards drafts. However, they are after dis­
cussion of and internalization ©f the drafts by those in whose names 
they appeared so I’d be quite willing to credit then to Mboya-Kenyatta- 
Kibaki (to a degree and with a somewhat different reading of seme parts).
VII.INTELLECTUALS
Marxism is fashionable in intellectual circles in most countries. Thus 
that it i3 so in Africa is hardly surprising. What is perhaps surprising 
is how undigested and unAfricauized a Jpod deal of it is.
It is also a rather handy form of escapism. It provides an excuse for 
failure to have any impact on government and for failure t© take part 
in reformism. One can a&sily keep ones hands as we11 as ones ideology 
clean that way. The Preach African Student Federation (FEANF) strikes 
ml as a wonderful example of that. (They have at times driven the 
International Union of Students mad by how hard a line they take,they 
certainly nearly broke up the Tunisia international seminar on students 
and economic change in 1961, even though UGET and Ben Salah were clearly 
wanting a neo-Marxist,international class system orientation. The Yugo­
slav and Polish academic participants and I had rather similar views on 
the irrelevance and escapism being displayed and that it prevented any 
useful discussion or work so long as it went on....) It is perhaps sig­
nificant that when they go home FEaNF members are not notably radical 
if they get good positions (if not they sometimes are), e.g. Albert 
Teyoedjre (sp) went from President of FilANF by stages to be a semisr 
official in Dahomey ( how I ’m not quite sure ,he onceheaded a party in 
3en gal but that wouldn’t mean he wasn't Dahoaeyan-the name seems t® 
ae to be) to Secretary General of PC AM.* Sic transit gloria Marx.
In a number of eas63 the Marxism seems more anexpresaion of rage 
igainst the dying of the light than aa internalized faith or intel­
lectual creed of much specificity. Ia the Sudan for example the 
student-gr^duate choice has usually been between the Communist Party 
(or its various fronts) and the Ikhwan Musseliaan(The Moslem Brotherhood). 
And che assassinated Tunisian opposition leader (name escapes me) was 
always swinging between Moscow and the Moslem Brotherhood. This may 
©f course simply hark back to the problem of Marx in Africa being to® 
European in prophets and presentation. One could argue that Marxism's 
appeal in the Sudan is in being more logical and modern while the 
Moslem Brothers appear as the legitimate heirs to the radical nat­
ionalism of the Mahdi and thus the students swing between the tw© 
because they want what each has but are repelled again by its gaps.
v m .  tkade unions
Morocco and Guinea yes. These are perhaps classic cases of a Marxist 
political action oriented trade union. The Moroccan case is somewhat 
marred by UGT syndicalism but this can also be read as pragmatism.... 
if the unions could not soon deliver political power it*was best to 
Be able to deliver economic gains to the workers iin the interim and 
thus keep a satisfied power base.
Tunisia'3 uniona before the gruster of Ben Salah (1959?) were another 
case albeit Ben Salah was never all chat close to WGT so far aa I know.
IGTAH was certainly Marxist but not very sensibly so outside Guinea.
It didn’t really get its interior power bases in order and tended t© 
clash violently with FDA units which is hardly the way to a popular front.
Tl^-Ghana. NO. Unless ©no wants t© take the crassest Stalinist manip­
ulation of Trade unions as devices t© fteld down workers as Marx.
That there was of course but not much in the way of either indoctrin­
ation or Stahkanevisxa to make the system work.
Nigeria-not in the effective unions. The 1964 general strike would
be¥f theigovernment iB short order had its leadershipbees even normally politically conscious much less thinking Marxiscs.




2. South Africa-I think net* Spear,Poquo, ARM simply weren't organ­
ized hy Marxists. Spear is the question mark here depending hew 
one evaluates the operating ARC leadership,especially Kelson 
Mandela. ARM was thewviolentM(despairing) wing of the Liberal 
Party. Poqmo tended t© be the channelling of blind anger and 
Populism ^which is perhaps why it seeias te have continued better- 
less organization is needed....)
3. Mozambique-this is in part another case of fayc aaies. Dr. Mond- 
lane did not get his basic set of views froiTMarx. Pinal termin­
ology yes but not basic substance. Dos Santos is much more a 
Marxist intellectual.
4. Guinee de Sud-possibly. Certainly Cabral is Marxist influenced 
both as a politician and as a strategist (though not it would 
seem as an agronomic development economist). Indeed he is the 
inverse of Senghor in a sense-a Marxiste mais who has developed 
an independent ittfillectual stance which builds from selected 
elements of Marx-Lenin as a base rather than building by sub­
traction.
5. Ang©la-rGRAE-no. Holden Roberto is certainly no Marxist nor is he 
Marxist influenced (partly I think because he would view Marxism 
as European). MPLA-well yes but in a rather destructive way. The 
MPLA's varied splits have had a good deal to do with rather ab­
stract bits ©f Marxist theology and strategic theology derived 
from Lenin. (Virato da Cruz was the most well known case but 
there have been others.) WKITA-probably not. At least when I 
knew him (then leader in Holden's youth wing) he could hardly
be described as Marxist. Assuming his present reports of totally 
Angolan centred and based operations with no signifigant foreign 
support are true then he may have been influenced bynthe writings 
of Che Guevara.
POLICY
Here the problem really is "Which Marx?" There are after all quite 
a number. Por example Marx of the Herald Tribune on socialism under 
certain circumstances by progressive taxation, death duties, etc. 
would certainly fit Tunisia-indeed they are rather more radical than 
that-they nationalize things. Ditto Zambia I suppose,mere slowly.
Marx as seen by the authors of the Soviet and Yugoslav revolutions 
no. Marx as seen by People's China-which did make signifigant use 
©f national capitalists during the revolution and for some years after 
one could claim t© see in Tanzania.
Guinea and Mali have certainly tried to follow what they considered 
proper Marxian policies and at some points Ghana did as well. All 
three have been notable for making rather amazing botches by net 
uaing common sense in organization and timing. All three also suf- 
ferre& from ovej? asiucz1 ati zsi11 o n d 1 e ots t i n ttie cst se s o ^
Ghana and Mali-the creation ©f a "New Class".
The tendency of verbal Marxists in power in Africa seems to be t© 
preach slogans the masses. This works rather better before indep­
endence (then a la Danton seeing a mob run by #there go my people,
I must run ahead and lead them now I know where they are g#i»g#)it 
is rsttihrreasy t© lead by slogan and to give the impression that the 
slogan and the success are integrally reiated.). After independence 
it is harder and harder to keep finding new slogans to show why fail­
ures are totally the result of colonial period and not at all that 
of incumbent leadership. Genuine mans involvement after taking power 
is perhaps not something one is likely to learn from European Com­
munist parties. They tend to be very bureaucratized and either never 
to have held power or never to have had a mass party base from which 
they built. (Yugoslavia might be a more useful model in that sense 
or Korth Vietnam.)
One seems to get a number of strands-
1. Marxiste aais leading to quite un-Marxian programmes and policies 
combined with political stances highly Marxian in verbiage and 
partly so in e.g. Senghor
2. Initially non-Marxian positions developing into Marxiste mais
and then into independent neo-Marxian African positions e.g. Cabral 
perhaps Ben Seddek
3. Fairly orthodox Marxian positions with some modifications on the 
political stance level to meet perceived reality and(but) with
a mix of non-Marxist and very ill localized Marxist programmes 
and policies e.g. Keita, Toure
4. Marxiste de convenance leading t© ulitmately conservative policies 
,programmes, and stances e.g. Houphouet-Boigny
5. Marxist hard line leading to destruction e.g. Um Nyobe perhaps lakari 
but there I think destruction came first
6. Positions perhaps describable as ne®-Marxiah but »ot basically 
arrived at from Marx \fith" appropriate" (to stance) policies and 
programmes usually very much pragamatically oriented to perceived 
constraints (sometimes too much so) and rather varied verbal 
formulations e.g. Jourguiba, Kaunda, tltltltl, Obote, tllllf,Kibaki(?)
ehyMnbdi (?)
7* Clearly neo-Marxian stances, programmes, policies but not ones 
primarily derived from Marx although the formulators in general 
have read Marx and Marxians and are to some extent influenced by 
him/them e.g. Nyerere,M®ndlane,Nasser
8. Cases of apparant self confusion-Marxiaa elements scatterred in 
programmes, policies-but usually rather oddly or badly done- and 
usually dominant in verbal stance e.g. Kxrumah,Masaeaba-DebatfKaru*e
9. Probable Marxiste terminal®gique de convenance (or in some cases 
frauds) e.g. Mobutu, Gbenye(fraud), various Dahomeyan leaders,0 juk^u
si. r e l e v a n c e and r e l a t i v e f a i l u r e
1. Relevance in terms of weltanschaung should be high....but highest 
in writers like Luxembourg not very acceptable to orthodox European
CP.
2. Relevance of historical approach to economics potentially high but 
largely vitiated by economic theology approach often used by one 
school of Marxist economist and over-cautious apologetic stance ©f 
the practicing economist school of Marxists from Europe and also 
shadowed by the fact clearcut use ©f this places Socialist Europe 
in bourgois camp in international economic system analysis.
3. General sense ©f history-taken flexibly-relevance high in the 3ense 
that if one believes in the long run (even if not necessarily ij* 
historical inevitability and the wave of the future) ©ne should be 
more willing to take tw# steps forward, one to the side, one back and 
repeat and less fearful that one must leap on seizing the crest of 
the wave and trying to pull it after one before it does a Dover 
Beach.
4. Mut to acquire this relevance requires:
a. a willingness to look out from an Africa-African polity centered 
viewpoint;
b. flexibility as to strategy and tactics while keeping the overall 
frame and aims in mind;
c. clearsightedness in perceiving what the objective reality actually 
faced is and not a theological rxegisis of what it must be ©r a 
metaphysical speculation of what it were ©ughting to be
d. fro* "e" insight and c©mm®nsense in using "b" and not propounding 
"solutions" which in effect 3my explicitly, say implicitly, or
when tried turn out to say "you can't get there from here"
- 9.
'
5. None of the above has been particularly comm®a in Marx as presented 
or as perceived in Africa. If one argues that President Kyerere 
nas arrived at a basically Marxian orientation and stance by roads 
other than Marxism this is an argument for the potential relevance 
of Marx in Africa and ft ^ c  q ^ w6y)*ti 0 3ft llX S (M ^ S ) H^0— 
si®»aries t© Africa. T© gea*rali ze a comment made to me by several 
Ceylonese when I inquired whynthe three Marxist parties ( Communist 
neo-Marxist Populist, "Trostskyite”) did so badly despite being 
well organized and in the "Troatkyite" case having a leader who was 
felt by plenty of people outside his voters to be the most nationally 
• rented (Tamil as well as Sinhalese) and intellectually able of 
the political leaders- Marx in Africa is to© Western. He is presented 
as part an£ parcel of the world that Europe made and made in its own 
interest and with little concern for its meaning to the Tiers Monde 
even if with a paternalistic arrogant assurance that it was for the 
welfare ©f "lesser breeds without the law” as well. (In that regard 
the Chinese should have a considerable headstart. On the other hand 
lack of a cultural and intellectual superiority complex has not been 
a notable Chinese characteristic in China's great eras although they 
have normally not been s© sure it could be exported lock stock and fcarreli).
I hope the above may be ©f some use to you.(It has been interesting to 
note and write to see where I would come out and why.) If you want 
elucidation or partial references 1*11 try to oblige.
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